2 files changed, 86 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/gpg/cool.md b/wiki/gpg/cool.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae5962c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wiki/gpg/cool.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# GPG Is Pretty Cool
+
+The GPG software suite is a pretty elegant cryptosystem. It provides:
+
+* A standard, well-maintained set of tools for creating and storing keys, and
+  associating them with identities
+
+* A suite of reliable tools for encrypting, signing, decrypting, and
+  verifying data that can be easily assembled into any combination of
+  integrity checks, authenticity checks, and privacy management
+
+* A key distribution network that does not rely on hierarchal authority and
+  that can be bootstrapped from scratch quickly and easily
+
+While GPG [sucks in a number of important ways](terrible), it's also the best
+tool we have right now for restoring privacy to private correspondance over
+the internet.
+
+## Code Signing
+
+Pretty much every Linux distribution relies on GPG for code signing. Rather
+than using GPG's web-of-trust model for key distribution, however, code
+signing with GPG usually creates a hierarchal PKI so that the root keys can
+be shipped with the operating system.
+
+This works shockingly well, and support for GPG is extremely well integrated
+into common package management systems such as apt and yum.
+
+## Source Control
+
+Which is basically code signing, admittedly, but even Git's support for GPG
+is basically great. Tools like Fossil embed it even deeper, and work quite
+well.
+
+## Email
+
+GPG's integration with email is surprisingly clever, follows a number of
+long-standing best practices for extending email, and does a _very_ good job
+of providing some guarantees that make sense in a not-terribly-long-ago view
+of email as a communications medium. In particular, if
+
+* who you talk to is not a secret, and
+* what, broadly, you are talking about is not a secret, but
+* the specifics of the discussion _are_ a secret, and
+* all participants are using GPG on their own mailers
+
+then GPG works brilliantly and modern GPG integration is very effective.
+
+These assumptions pretty accurately reflect the majority of email use up
+through the late 90s and early 2000s: technical or personal correspondence
+between known acquaintences.
+
+The internet has moved on from email for casual correspondence, but that
+doesn't invalidate the elegance of GPG's integration for GPG users.
+
+## Distributed Verification
+
+Even though GPG's trust model has some serious privacy costs and concerns, it
+works as a great proof of concept for CA-free identity management. That's
+huge: centralized CAs have even more onerous costs and worse risks than GPG's
+trust network, while offering less transparency to help offset those costs.
+
+Others have written some pretty interesting things on how to improve GPG's
+trust model and make it less succeptible to errors or key leaks by
+small-to-middling numbers of participants. [This
+post](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030235.html)
+to tor-talk last year is probably the most complete.
diff --git a/wiki/gpg/terrible.md b/wiki/gpg/terrible.md
index 28edf23..46a65c4 100644
--- a/wiki/gpg/terrible.md
+++ b/wiki/gpg/terrible.md
@@ -9,13 +9,15 @@ incentives to screw you, or GPG.
 S/MIME in the wild is a total non-starter. GPG, on the other hand, is merely
 really, _really_ bad.
 
+(You may want to take this with a side of [the other perspective](cool).)
+
 ## Body Security And Nothing Else
 
-GPG encrypts and signs email message bodies. That's it, that's all it does.
-Email contains lots of other useful, potentially sensitive data: the subject
-line, for example. GPG still exposes all of the headers for the world to see,
-and conversely does nothing to detect or prevent header tampering by idiot
-mailers.
+GPG encrypts and signs email message bodies. That's it, that's all it does
+when integrated with email. Email messages contain lots of other useful,
+potentially sensitive data: the subject line, for example. GPG still exposes
+all of the headers for the world to see, and conversely does nothing to
+detect or prevent header tampering by idiot mailers.
 
 (Yes. Signed headers _would_ mean that mailing lists can no longer inject
 `[listname]` crud into your messages. Feature, not bug; we should be, and in
@@ -39,14 +41,14 @@ you, this policy is harmful and limiting. There are good theoretical reasons
 to validate _an_ identity before using its keys to secure messages, but legal
 identities can be anywhere from awkward to dangerous to use.
 
-GPG does not _technically_ restrict users from creating pseudonymous keys,
-but the community at large discourages their use unless they can be traced
-back to some legal identity. Pseudonymous keys tend to go unsigned by any
-other key, cutting them off from the GPG trust network's validation effect.
+GPG does not _technically_ restrict users from creating autonymous keys, but
+the community at large discourages their use unless they can be traced back
+to some legal identity. Autonyms keys tend to go unsigned by any other key,
+cutting them off from the GPG trust network's validation effect.
 
 ## Finding Paul Revere
 
-It turns out pseudonymity in GPG would be pretty fragile even if GPG's user
+It turns out autonymity in GPG would be pretty fragile even if GPG's user
 community _didn't_ insist on puncturing it at every opportunity, since GPG
 irrevocably publishes the social graph of its users to every keyserver they
 use. You don't even have to publish it yourself; anyone who has a copy of
@@ -99,6 +101,11 @@ users](https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/), so that's something.
 
 ## Mobile Need Not Apply
 
-Safely distributing GPG keys to mobile applications is more or less
+<del>Safely distributing GPG keys to mobile applications is more or less
 impossible, and integration with mobile mail applications is nonexistant.
-Hope you only ever read your mail from a Real Computer!
+Hope you only ever read your mail from a Real Computer!</del>
+
+vollkorn points out that the above is inaccurate. He posted a couuple of
+options for GPG on Android, and the state of the art for iOS GPG apps is
+apparently better than I was able to find. See [his
+comment](#comment-1422227740) for details.