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authorojacobson <ojacobson@noreply.codeberg.org>2025-07-23 00:05:17 +0200
committerojacobson <ojacobson@noreply.codeberg.org>2025-07-23 00:05:17 +0200
commit64639acbab02aa4103cbe44199e38991269b2137 (patch)
tree7996fdc7d2034c9da85b4d7d2ad5ebbbdc6a2804 /src/umask.rs
parent0867790d87ebbbedb6b20b52139055e109031033 (diff)
parentdc240ca270f86552e999c81d864b4cb0c687a88e (diff)
Add a `--umask` option to determine what permissions new files/databases get.
The new `--umask` option takes one of three values: * `--umask masked`, the default, takes the inherited umask and forces o+rwx on. * `--umask inherit` takes the inherited umask as-is. * `--umask OCTAL` sets the umask to exactly `OCTAL` and is broadly equivalent to `umask OCTAL && pilcrow --umask inherit`. This fell out of a conversation with @wlonk, who is working on notifications. Since notifications may require [VAPID] keys, the server will need a way to store those keys. That would generally be "in the pilcrow database," which lead me to the observation that Pilcrow creates that database as world-readable by default. "World-readable" and "encryption/signing keys" are not things that belong in the same sentence. [VAPID]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8292 The most "obvious" solution would be to set the permissions used for the sqlite database when it's created. That's harder than it sounds: sqlite has no built-in facility for doing this. The closest thing that exists today is the [`modeof`] query parameter, which copies the permissions (and ownership) from some other file. We also can't reliably set the permissions ourselves, as sqlite may - depending on build options and configuration - [create multiple files][wal]. [`modeof`]: https://www.sqlite.org/uri.html [wal]: https://www.sqlite.org/wal.html Using `umask` is a whole-process solution to this. As Pilcrow doesn't attempt to create other files, there's little issue with doing it this way, but this is a design risk for future work if it creates files that are _intended_ to be readable by more than just the Pilcrow daemon user. Merges options-umask into main.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/umask.rs')
-rw-r--r--src/umask.rs116
1 files changed, 116 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/umask.rs b/src/umask.rs
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/umask.rs
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+use std::{fmt, str};
+
+use nix::{
+ libc::mode_t,
+ sys::stat::{self, Mode},
+};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub enum Umask {
+ Masked,
+ Inherit,
+ Set(Mode),
+}
+
+impl Umask {
+ pub fn set(self) {
+ match self {
+ Self::Masked => Self::masked(),
+ Self::Inherit => Self::inherit(),
+ Self::Set(mode) => Self::set_to(mode),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn masked() {
+ // In the year 2025, this is _still_ the only reasonable way to check the
+ // process' current umask. This is also why we don't calculate a default
+ // umask and stick it in Clap's `default_value_t` - I'd prefer not to touch
+ // the process' umask before we know what we're doing with it, but there's
+ // no other way to look at the current one.
+ //
+ // The choice of `all` here is a complicated compromise. In theory, nothing
+ // will ever observe this umask, as we immediately overwrite it immediately
+ // below. As of this writing, there is nothing in this service that could
+ // create a file in this interval, which could then be affected by the
+ // temporary umask. However, future code changes _could_ introduce something
+ // that races with this, such as a signal handler that does more than just
+ // exiting the process.
+ //
+ // Using `all` makes sure that _any_ file created in that interval is
+ // created with "deny all" file permission bits, which will make it useless
+ // even for this program. Hopefully, that failure will be immediate enough
+ // to attract attention. The other alternatives which might work are zero
+ // (don't mask off any permissions, things might be globally readable)
+ // or 0o0027 (the permissions we'd want to use on most Linux distros, which
+ // could then silently hide the above race condition).
+ let current = stat::umask(Mode::all());
+
+ // In addition to whatever we inherit, by default, we ensure that files
+ // created by pilcrow are not world-readable or world-writeable. However,
+ // we respect the inherited group and user permissions on the assumption
+ // that the user, or their administrator, has either made a decision about
+ // group permissions, or are relying on the distro's defaults.
+ //
+ // The main thing `pilcrow` creates are its database and its backup
+ // database, which can contain both confidential information (users'
+ // conversations) and sensitive information (the service's configuration
+ // and any API tokens, keys, &c used by the service).
+ //
+ // There is no way to tell `sqlite` to restrict the permissions of database
+ // files directly, which is otherwise what we'd prefer.
+ let desired = current | Mode::S_IRWXO;
+
+ stat::umask(desired);
+ }
+
+ fn inherit() {
+ // Here's a complete list of steps required to inherit the umask from the calling process:
+ }
+
+ fn set_to(mode: Mode) {
+ stat::umask(mode);
+ }
+}
+
+impl str::FromStr for Umask {
+ type Err = Error;
+
+ fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+ let umask = match s {
+ "masked" => Self::Masked,
+ "inherit" => Self::Inherit,
+ octal => {
+ let mode = mode_t::from_str_radix(octal, 8)?;
+ let mode = Mode::from_bits(mode).ok_or(Error::UnknownBits)?;
+ Self::Set(mode)
+ }
+ };
+
+ Ok(umask)
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for Umask {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ Self::Masked => "masked".fmt(f),
+ Self::Inherit => "inherit".fmt(f),
+ Self::Set(mode) => write!(f, "{mode:o}"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Errors occurring during umask option parsing.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+ /// Failed to parse a umask value from the input.
+ #[error(transparent)]
+ Parse(#[from] std::num::ParseIntError),
+
+ /// The provided umask contained invalid bits. (See the constants associated with [`Mode`] for
+ /// valid umask bits.)
+ // We dont need to hold onto the actual umask value here - Clap does that for us, and prints
+ // the value as the user input it, which beats anything we could do here.
+ #[error("unknown bits in umask")]
+ UnknownBits,
+}