| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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The semantics of this endpoint are somewhat complex, and are incompletely captured in the associated docs change. For posterity, the intended workflow is:
1. Obtain Pilcrow's current VAPID key by connecting (it's in the events, either from boot or from the event stream).
2. Use the browser push APIs to create a push subscription, using that VAPID key.
3. Send Pilcrow the push subscription endpoint and keys, plus the VAPID key the client used to create it so that the server can detect race conditions with key rotation.
4. Wait for messages to arrive.
This commit does not introduce any actual messages, just subscription management endpoints.
When the server's VAPID key is rotated, all existing subscriptions are discarded. Without the VAPID key, the server cannot service those subscriptions. We can't exactly notify the broker to stop processing messages on those subscriptions, so this is an incomplete solution to what to do if the key is being rotated due to a compromise, but it's better than nothing.
The shape of the API endpoint is heavily informed by the [JSON payload][web-push-json] provided by browser Web Push implementations, to ease client development in a browser-based context. The idea is that a client can take that JSON and send it to the server verbatim, without needing to transform it in any way, to submit the subscription to the server for use.
[web-push-json]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PushSubscription/toJSON
Push subscriptions are operationally associated with a specific _user agent_, and have no inherent relationship with a Pilcrow login or token (session). Taken as-is, a subscription created by user A could be reused by user B if they share a user agent, even if user A logs out before user B logs in. Pilcrow therefore _logically_ associates push subscriptions with specific tokens, and abandons those subscriptions when the token is invalidated by
* logging out,
* expiry, or
* changing passwords.
(There are no other token invalidation workflows at this time.)
Stored subscriptions are also abandoned when the server's VAPID key changes.
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The [Serde attribute docs][serde-attr] don't spell out that this will work, but experimentally, it looks like a module used with `#[serde(with)]` only needs to have the `encode`/`decode` functions if they're actually used, and can be "incomplete" if the missing ones are also unused in your code. That's the case here: we serialize VAPID keys, but never deserialize them.
[serde-attr]: https://serde.rs/field-attrs.html#with
This improves organization a bit in my view, but more importantly it also sets us up for a coming change where we _will_ start deserializing VAPID keys, and where I'd like to use the same logic: giving it its own module will make that easier to organize.
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This is the same "use a component directly rather than obtaining one from the `App`" change that was previously applied to most endpoints and middleware. I just forgot to do it here when making that change.
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In 4a91792e023a5877f8ac9b8a352e99c4486d698f, I merged in the app component struct changes, but neglected to notice that the `app.vapid()` method had ended up attached to the wrong impl block during the merge. This fixes that.
I've also carried the change to component structs through, so `Vapid` is now a freestanding component, rather than a view of the `App` struct's internals.
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The `web-push` crate's VAPID signing support requires a private key. The `p256` crate is more than capable of generating one, but the easiest way to get a key from a `p256::ecdsa::SigningKey` to a `web_push::PartialVapidSignature` is via PKCS #8 PEM, not via the bytes. Since we'll need it in that form anyways, store it that way, so that we don't have to decode it using `p256`, re-encode to PEM, then decode to `PartialVapidSignature`.
The migration in this commit invalidates existing VAPID keys. We could include support for re-encoding them on read, but there's little point: this code is still in flux anyways, and only development deployments exist. By the time this is final, the schema will have settled.
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an App.
There are a few places in the test fixtures that still call `App` methods directly, as they call `app.users()` (which, as per previous commits, has no `FromRef` impl).
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Because `Users` is test-only and is not used in any endpoints, it doesn't need a FromRef impl.
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As with the `Setup` component, I've generalized the associated middleware across anything that can provide a `Tokens`, where possible.
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The changes to the setup-requiring middleware are probably more general than was strictly needed, but they will make it work with anything that can provide a `Setup` component rather than being bolted to `App` specifically, which feels tidier.
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This one doesn't need a FromRef impl at this time, as it's only ever used in a handler that also uses other components and so will need to continue receiving `App`. However, there's little reason not to make the implementatino of the `Events` struct consistent.
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Unlike the previous example, this involves cloning an event broadcaster, as well. This is, per the documentation, how the type may be used. From <https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/sync/broadcast/fn.channel.html>:
> The Sender can be cloned to send to the same channel from multiple points in the process or it can be used concurrently from an `Arc`.
The language is less firm than the language sqlx uses for its pool, but the intent is clear enough, and it works in practice.
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`crate::app::App`'s internals.
In the course of working on web push, I determined that we probably need to make `App` generic over the web push client we're using, so that tests can use a dummy client while the real app uses a client created at startup and maintained over the life of the program's execution. The most direct implementation of that is to render App as `App<P>`, where the parameter is occupied by the specific web push client type in use. However, doing this requires refactoring at _every_ site that mentions `App`, including every handler, even though the vast majority of those sites will not be concerned with web push.
I reviewed a few options with @wlonk:
* Accept the type parameter and apply it everywhere, as the cost of supporting web push.
* Hard-code the use of a specific web push client.
* Insulate handlers &c from `App` via provider traits, mimicing what we do for repository provider traits today.
* Treat each app type as a freestanding state in its own right, so that only push-related components need to consider push clients (as far as is feasible).
This is a prototype towards that last point, using a simple app component (boot) as a testbed. `FromRef` allows handlers that take a `Boot` to be used in routes that provide an `App`, so this is a contained change. However, the structure of `FromRef` prevents `Boot` from carrying any lifetime narrower than `'static`, so it now holds clones of the state fields it acquires from App, instead of references. This is fine - that's just a database pool, and sqlx's pool type is designed to be shared via cloning. From <https://docs.rs/sqlx/latest/sqlx/struct.Pool.html>:
> Cloning Pool is cheap as it is simply a reference-counted handle to the inner pool state.
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In spite of my design preference away from CLI tools, this is a CLI tool: `pilcrow --database-url <URL> rotate-vapid-key`. This is something we can implement here and now, which does not require us to confront the long-avoided issue of how to handle the idea that some users are allowed to make server-operational changes and some aren't, by delegating the problem back to the OS.
The implementation is a little half-baked to make it easier to rip out later. I would ordinarily prefer to push both `serve` (the default verb, not actually named in this change) and `rotate-vapid-key` into their own, separate CLI submodules, with their own argument structs, but that change is much more intrusive and would make this effectively permanent. This can be yanked out in a few minutes by deleting a few lines of `cli.rs` and inlining the `serve` function.
Nonetheless, nothing is as permanent as a temporary solution, so I've written at least some bare-minimum operations documentation on how to use this and what it does.
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VAPID is used to authenticate applications to push brokers, as part of the [Web Push] specification. It's notionally optional, but we believe [Apple requires it][apple], and in any case making it impossible to use subscription URLs without the corresponding private key available, and thus harder to impersonate the server, seems like a good security practice regardless.
[Web Push]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Push_API
[apple]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/usernotifications/sending-web-push-notifications-in-web-apps-and-browsers
There are several implementations of VAPID for Rust:
* [web_push](https://docs.rs/web-push/latest/web_push/) includes an implementation of VAPID but requires callers to provision their own keys. We will likely use this crate for Web Push fulfilment, but we cannot use it for key generation.
* [vapid](https://docs.rs/vapid/latest/vapid/) includes an implementation of VAPID key generation. It delegates to `openssl` to handle cryptographic operations.
* [p256](https://docs.rs/p256/latest/p256/) implements NIST P-256 in Rust. It's maintained by the RustCrypto team, though as of this writing it is largely written by a single contributor. It isn't specifically designed for use with VAPID.
I opted to use p256 for this, as I believe the RustCrypto team are the most likely to produce a correct and secure implementation, and because openssl has consistently left a bad taste in my mouth for years. Because it's a general implementation of the algorithm, I expect that it will require more work for us to adapt it for use with VAPID specifically; I'm willing to chance it and we can swap it out for the vapid crate if it sucks.
This has left me with one area of uncertainty: I'm not actually sure I'm using the right parts of p256. The choice of `ecdsa::SigningKey` over `p256::SecretKey` is based on [the MDN docs] using phrases like "This value is part of a signing key pair generated by your application server, and usable with elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA), over the P-256 curve." and on [RFC 8292]'s "The 'k' parameter includes an ECDSA public key in uncompressed form that is encoded using base64url encoding. However, we won't be able to test my implementation until we implement some other key parts of Web Push, which are out of scope of this commit.
[the MDN docs]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/PushSubscription/options
[RFC 8292]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8292#section-3.2
Following the design used for storing logins and users, VAPID keys are split into a non-synchronized part (consisting of the private key), whose exposure would allow others to impersonate the Pilcrow server, and a synchronized part (consisting of event coordinates and, notionally, the public key), which is non-sensitive and can be safely shared with any user. However, the public key is derived from the stored private key, rather than being stored directly, to minimize redundancy in the stored data.
Following the design used for expiring stale entities, the app checks for and creates, or rotates, its VAPID key using middleware that runs before most API requests. If, at that point, the key is either absent, or more than 30 days old, it is replaced. This imposes a small tax on API request latency, which is used to fund prompt and automatic key rotation without the need for an operator-facing key management interface.
VAPID keys are delivered to clients via the event stream, as laid out in `docs/api/events.md`. There are a few reasons for this, but the big one is that changing the VAPID key would immediately invalidate push subscriptions: we throw away the private key, so we wouldn't be able to publish to them any longer. Clients must replace their push subscriptions in order to resume delivery, and doing so promptly when notified that the key has changed will minimize the gap.
This design is intended to allow for manual key rotation. The key can be rotated "immedately" by emptying the `vapid_key` and `vapid_signing_key` tables (which destroys the rotated kye); the server will generate a new one before it is needed, and will notify clients that the key has been invalidated.
This change includes client support for tracking the current VAPID key. The client doesn't _use_ this information anywhere, yet, but it has it.
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Per <https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/sync/broadcast/struct.Sender.html>, a `Sender` is safe to share between threads. The clone behaviour we want is also provided by its `Clone` impl directly, and we don't need to wrap the sender in an `Arc` to share it.
It's amazing what you can find in the docs.
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This conversion, from an iterator of type-specific events (say, `user::Event` or `message::Event`), into a `Vec<event::Event>`, is prevasive, and it needs to be done each time. Having Broadcaster expose a support method for this cuts down on the repetition, at the cost of a slightly alarming amount of type-system nonsense in `broadcast_from`.
Historical footnote: the internal message structure is a Vec and not an individual message so that bulk operations, like expiring channels and messages, won't disconnect everyone if they happen to dispatch more than sixteen messages (current queue depth limit) at once. We trade allocation and memory pressure for keeping the connections alive. _Most_ event publishing is an iterator of one item, so the Vec allocation is redundant.
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I found a test bug! The tests for deleting previously-deleted or previously-expired tests were using the wrong user to try to delete those messages. The tests happened to pass anyways because the message authorship check was done after the message lifecycle check. They would have no longer passed; the tests are fixed to use the sender, instead.
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This replaces the approach of having the repo type know about conversation lifecycle in detail. Instead, the repo type accepts events and applies them to the DB blindly. The SQL written to implement each event does, however, embed assumptions about what order events will happen in.
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The taxonomy is now as follows:
* A _login_ is someone's identity for the purposes of authenticating to the service. Logins are not synchronized, and in fact are not published anywhere in the current API. They have a login ID, a name and a password.
* A _user_ is someone's identity for the purpose of participating in conversations. Users _are_ synchronized, as before. They have a user ID, a name, and a creation instant for the purposes of synchronization.
## API changes
* `GET /api/boot` method now returns a `login` key instead of a `user` key. The structure of the nested value is unchanged. This change is not backwards-compatible; the included client and the docs have been updated accordingly.
## Server implementation
* Most app methods that took a `&User` as an identity now take a `&Login` as an identity, instead. Where a `User` is needed, the new `tx.users().for_login(&login)` database access method resolves a `Login` to its corresponding `user::History`, which can then be turned into a `User` at whatever point in time is most appropriate.
This adds a few new error cases to methods that traverse the login-to-history-to-user chain. Those cases are presently unreachable, but I've fully fleshed them out so that they don't bite us later. Most of the resulting errors, however, are captured as internal server errors.
* There is a new `app.logins()` application entry point, dealing with login identities and password-based logins.
* `app.tokens()` is a bit more limited in scope to only things that work with an existing token.
That has the side effect of splitting up logging in (in `app.logins().with_password(…)`) and logging out (in `app.tokens().logout(…)`).
## Schema changes
The `user` table has been split:
* `login` holds the data needed for the user to log in - their login ID, their name, and their password.
* `user` now holds only the user ID and the event data for the user's `created` instant. Reconstructing a `User` struct requires joining in data from both `login` and `user`.
In theory, the relationship is one-way: every user has a login. In practice, it's reciprocal: every login has a user and every user has a login.
Relationships with downstream tables have been modified to suit:
* `message` still refers to `user` for authorship information.
* `invite` still refers to `user` for originator information.
* `token` refers to `login` for authentication information.
## Blimy, that's big
Yeah, I know. It's hard to avoid and I'm not sure the effort of making this in incremental steps is worth it.
Authentication logic has a way of getting into all sorts of corners, and Pilcrow is no different. In order for the new taxonomy to make sense, all of the places that previously used `User` as a representation of an authenticated identity have to be updated, and it's easier to do that all at once, so that we can retire all the code that _supports_ using a `User` that way.
Merges split-user into main.
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The taxonomy is now as follows:
* A _login_ is someone's identity for the purposes of authenticating to the service. Logins are not synchronized, and in fact are not published anywhere in the current API. They have a login ID, a name and a password.
* A _user_ is someone's identity for the purpose of participating in conversations. Users _are_ synchronized, as before. They have a user ID, a name, and a creation instant for the purposes of synchronization.
In practice, a user exists for every login - in fact, users' names are stored in the login table and are joined in, rather than being stored redundantly in the user table. A login ID and its corresponding user ID are always equal, and the user and login ID types support conversion and comparison to facilitate their use in this context.
Tokens are now associated with logins, not users. The currently-acting identity is passed down into app types as a login, not a user, and then resolved to a user where appropriate within the app methods.
As a side effect, the `GET /api/boot` method now returns a `login` key instead of a `user` key. The structure of the nested value is unchanged.
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This is the leading edge of a larger storage refactoring, where repo types stop doing things like generating secrets or deciding whether to carry out an operation. To make this work, there is now a `Token` type that holds the complete state of a token, in memory.
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We'll be building separate entities around this in future commits, to better separate the authentication data (non-synchronized and indeed "not public") from the chat data (synchronized and public).
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These checks tended to be wordy, and were prone to being done subtly differently in different locations for no good reason. Centralizing them cleans this up and makes the tests easier to follow, at the expense of making it somewhat harder to follow what the test is specifically checking.
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identity token.
This is a small refactoring that's been possible for a while, and we only just noticed.
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I've been doing this by hand anyways, and this makes it a _ton_ less tedious to maintain. I think it looks nice.
This does, however, require nightly - for formatting only.
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As with the previous commits, the body was never actually being used.
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As with `/api/setup`, the response was an ad-hoc choice, which we are not using and which constrains future development just by existing.
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This API response was always ad-hoc, and the client doesn't use it. To free up some maneuvering room for server refactorings, stop sending it. We can add a response in the future if there's a need.
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This is a bit tidier and easier to assert on than returning a bare HTTP status code, but is otherwise interchangeable with it.
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These were separated as there wasn't an obvious way to serialize two fields with the same _type_ with different _prefixes_. Turns out this is a common problem, and someone's written a crate for it that remaps the names for you.
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Having this buried under `crate::user` makes it hard to split up the roles `user` fulfils right now. Moving it out to its own module makes it a bit tidier to reuse it in a separate, authentication-only way.
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There's already an implicit conversion (via serialization), it's just awkward to use. However, we now need those conversions more directly.
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Rust 1.89 added a new warning:
warning: hiding a lifetime that's elided elsewhere is confusing
--> src/setup/repo.rs:4:14
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4 | fn setup(&mut self) -> Setup;
| ^^^^^^^^^ ----- the same lifetime is hidden here
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| the lifetime is elided here
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= help: the same lifetime is referred to in inconsistent ways, making the signature confusing
help: use `'_` for type paths
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4 | fn setup(&mut self) -> Setup<'_>;
| ++++
I don't entirely agree with the style advice here, but lifetime elision style is an evolving area in Rust and I'd rather track the Rust team's recommendations than invent my own, so I've added all of them.
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In 792de8e49fa8a3c04bfb747adadf71572d753055, `crate::cli::Error` was made private. I forgot to update the doctest that mentions it.
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This is based heavily on the work done for normalized strings, in `crate::normalize`. The key realization in that module is that the logic distinguishing one kind of thing (normalized strings in that case, IDs, in this case) can be packaged up as a type token, and that doing so may reduce the overall complexity. This implementation for ID also borrows heavily from the implementation for normalized strings.
It's less flexible: an ID implemented this way can't expose _less_ of `crate::id::ID`'s interface, whereas newtype wrappers can, for example. However, our code doesn't use that flexiblity on purpose anywhere and we're relatively unlikely to change that. In return, the individual ID types require substantially less code - they do not, for example, need to re-implement `Display` for themselves.
I very nearly made the trait `Prefix`:
```rust
pub trait Prefix {
const PREFIX: &str;
}
```
however, I think having an effectively-constant method is less surprising overall.
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This might be the pettiest rude change I've ever made to a Rust program. If I saw this - or did this - in code _intend_ to be used as a library, I'd be appalled.
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The Pilcrow crate library docs are something of a wart; Pilcrow isn't meant to be used as a library, and the only public interface it exposes is the CLI entry point. However, we will likely be publishing Pilcrow via crates.io (among other options), and so it will _be usable_ as a library if you're desperate enough to try. The docs should at least be coherent.
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The new `--umask` option takes one of three values:
* `--umask masked`, the default, takes the inherited umask and forces o+rwx on.
* `--umask inherit` takes the inherited umask as-is.
* `--umask OCTAL` sets the umask to exactly `OCTAL` and is broadly equivalent to `umask OCTAL && pilcrow --umask inherit`.
This fell out of a conversation with @wlonk, who is working on notifications. Since notifications may require [VAPID] keys, the server will need a way to store those keys. That would generally be "in the pilcrow database," which lead me to the observation that Pilcrow creates that database as world-readable by default. "World-readable" and "encryption/signing keys" are not things that belong in the same sentence.
[VAPID]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8292
The most "obvious" solution would be to set the permissions used for the sqlite database when it's created. That's harder than it sounds: sqlite has no built-in facility for doing this. The closest thing that exists today is the [`modeof`] query parameter, which copies the permissions (and ownership) from some other file. We also can't reliably set the permissions ourselves, as sqlite may - depending on build options and configuration - [create multiple files][wal].
[`modeof`]: https://www.sqlite.org/uri.html
[wal]: https://www.sqlite.org/wal.html
Using `umask` is a whole-process solution to this. As Pilcrow doesn't attempt to create other files, there's little issue with doing it this way, but this is a design risk for future work if it creates files that are _intended_ to be readable by more than just the Pilcrow daemon user.
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