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-# Design Mistakes
-
-## Is Gossamer Up?
-
-[@megtastique](https://twitter.com/megtastique) points out that two factors
-doom the whole design:
-
-1. There's no way to remove content from Gossamer once it's published, and
-
-2. Gossamer can anonymously share images.
-
-Combined, these make Gossamer the _perfect_ vehicle for revenge porn and
-other gendered, sexually-loaded network abuse.
-
-This alone is enough to doom the design, as written: even restricting the
-size of messages to the single kilobyte range still makes it trivial to
-irrevocably disseminate _links_ to similar content.
-
-## Protected Feeds? Who Needs Those?
-
-Gossamer's design does not carry forward an important Twitter feature: the
-protected feed. In brief, protected feeds allow people to be choosy about who
-reads their status updates, without necessarily having to pick and choose who
-gets to read them on a message by message basis.
-
-This is an important privacy control for people who wish to engage with
-people they know without necessarily disclosing their whereabouts and
-activities to the world at large. In particular, it's important to vulnerable
-people because it allows them to create their own safe spaces.
-
-Protected feeds are not mere technology, either. Protected feeds carry with
-them social expectations: Twitter clients often either refuse to copy text
-from a protected feed, or present a warning when the user tries to copy text,
-which acts as a very cheap and, apparently, quite effective brake on the
-casual re-sharing that Twitter encourages for public feeds.
-
-## DDOS As A Service
-
-Gossamer's network protocol converges towards a total graph, where every node
-knows how to connect to every other node, and new information (new posts)
-rapidly push out to every single node.
-
-If you've ever been privy to the Twitter “firehose” feed, you'll understand
-why this is a drastic mistake. Even a moderately successful social network
-sees on the order of millions of messages a day. Delivering _all_ of this
-directly to _every_ node _all_ of the time would rapidly drown users in
-bandwidth charges and render their internet connections completely unusable.
-
-Gossamer's design also has no concept of “quiet” periods: every fifteen to
-thirty seconds, rain or shine, every node is supposed to wake up and exchange
-data with some other node, regardless of how long it's been since either node
-in the exchange has seen new data. This very effectively ensures that
-Gossamer will continue to flood nodes with traffic at all times; the only way
-to halt the flood is to shut off the Gossamer client.
-
-## Passive Nodes Matter
-
-It's impractical to run an inbound data service on a mobile device. Mobile
-devices are, by and large, not addressable or reachable by the internet at
-large.
-
-Mobile devices also provide a huge proportion of Twitter's content: the
-ability to rapidly post photos, location tags, and short text while away from
-desks, laptops, and formal internet connections is a huge boon for ad-hoc
-social organization. You can invite someone to the pub from your phone, from
-in front of the pub.
-
-(This interacts ... poorly with the DDOS point, above.)
-
-## Traffic Analysis
-
-When a user enters a new status update or sends a new private message, their
-Gossamer node immediately forwards it to at least one other node to inject it
-into the network. This makes unencrypted Gossamer relatively vulnerable to
-traffic analysis for correlating Gossamer identities with human beings.
-
-Someone at a network “pinch point” -- an ISP, or a coffee shop wifi router --
-can monitor Gossamer traffic entering and exiting nodes on their network and
-easily identify which nodes originated which messages, and thus which nodes
-have access to which identities. This seriously compromises the effectiveness
-of Gossamer's decentralized, self-certifying identities.