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Diffstat (limited to 'wiki/gpg/terrible.md')
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diff --git a/wiki/gpg/terrible.md b/wiki/gpg/terrible.md index 28edf23..46a65c4 100644 --- a/wiki/gpg/terrible.md +++ b/wiki/gpg/terrible.md @@ -9,13 +9,15 @@ incentives to screw you, or GPG. S/MIME in the wild is a total non-starter. GPG, on the other hand, is merely really, _really_ bad. +(You may want to take this with a side of [the other perspective](cool).) + ## Body Security And Nothing Else -GPG encrypts and signs email message bodies. That's it, that's all it does. -Email contains lots of other useful, potentially sensitive data: the subject -line, for example. GPG still exposes all of the headers for the world to see, -and conversely does nothing to detect or prevent header tampering by idiot -mailers. +GPG encrypts and signs email message bodies. That's it, that's all it does +when integrated with email. Email messages contain lots of other useful, +potentially sensitive data: the subject line, for example. GPG still exposes +all of the headers for the world to see, and conversely does nothing to +detect or prevent header tampering by idiot mailers. (Yes. Signed headers _would_ mean that mailing lists can no longer inject `[listname]` crud into your messages. Feature, not bug; we should be, and in @@ -39,14 +41,14 @@ you, this policy is harmful and limiting. There are good theoretical reasons to validate _an_ identity before using its keys to secure messages, but legal identities can be anywhere from awkward to dangerous to use. -GPG does not _technically_ restrict users from creating pseudonymous keys, -but the community at large discourages their use unless they can be traced -back to some legal identity. Pseudonymous keys tend to go unsigned by any -other key, cutting them off from the GPG trust network's validation effect. +GPG does not _technically_ restrict users from creating autonymous keys, but +the community at large discourages their use unless they can be traced back +to some legal identity. Autonyms keys tend to go unsigned by any other key, +cutting them off from the GPG trust network's validation effect. ## Finding Paul Revere -It turns out pseudonymity in GPG would be pretty fragile even if GPG's user +It turns out autonymity in GPG would be pretty fragile even if GPG's user community _didn't_ insist on puncturing it at every opportunity, since GPG irrevocably publishes the social graph of its users to every keyserver they use. You don't even have to publish it yourself; anyone who has a copy of @@ -99,6 +101,11 @@ users](https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/), so that's something. ## Mobile Need Not Apply -Safely distributing GPG keys to mobile applications is more or less +<del>Safely distributing GPG keys to mobile applications is more or less impossible, and integration with mobile mail applications is nonexistant. -Hope you only ever read your mail from a Real Computer! +Hope you only ever read your mail from a Real Computer!</del> + +vollkorn points out that the above is inaccurate. He posted a couuple of +options for GPG on Android, and the state of the art for iOS GPG apps is +apparently better than I was able to find. See [his +comment](#comment-1422227740) for details. |