| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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When a user clicks "send a test notification," Pilcrow delivers a push message (with a fixed payload) to all active subscriptions. The included client then displays this as a notification, using browser APIs to do so. This lets us verify that push notification works, end to end - and it appears to.
The API endpoint for sending a test notification is not documented. I didn't feel it prudent to extensively document an endpoint that is intended to be temporary and whose side effects are very much subject to change. However, for posterity, the endpoint is
POST /api/push/ping
{}
and the push message payload is
ping
Subscriptions with permanent delivery failures are nuked when we encounter them. Subscriptions with temporary failures cause the `ping` endpoint to return an internal server error, and are not retried. We'll likely want retry logic - including retry logic to handle server restarts - for any more serious use, but for a smoke test, giving up immediately is fine.
To make the push implementation testable, `App` is now generic over it. Tests use a dummy implementation that stores sent messages in memory. This has some significant limitations, documented in the test suite, but it beats sending real notifications to nowhere in tests.
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The taxonomy is now as follows:
* A _login_ is someone's identity for the purposes of authenticating to the service. Logins are not synchronized, and in fact are not published anywhere in the current API. They have a login ID, a name and a password.
* A _user_ is someone's identity for the purpose of participating in conversations. Users _are_ synchronized, as before. They have a user ID, a name, and a creation instant for the purposes of synchronization.
In practice, a user exists for every login - in fact, users' names are stored in the login table and are joined in, rather than being stored redundantly in the user table. A login ID and its corresponding user ID are always equal, and the user and login ID types support conversion and comparison to facilitate their use in this context.
Tokens are now associated with logins, not users. The currently-acting identity is passed down into app types as a login, not a user, and then resolved to a user where appropriate within the app methods.
As a side effect, the `GET /api/boot` method now returns a `login` key instead of a `user` key. The structure of the nested value is unchanged.
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There's no good reason to use an empty string as your login name, or to use one so long as to annoy others. Names beginning or ending with whitespace, or containing runs of whitespace, are also a technical problem, so they're also prohibited.
This change does not implement [UTS #39], as I haven't yet fully understood how to do so.
[UTS #39]: https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/
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This also found a bug! No live event was being emitted during invite accept. The only way to find out about invites was to reconnect.
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* A `cookie::Identity` (`IdentityCookie`) is a specialized CookieJar for working with identities.
* An `Identity` is a token/login pair.
I hope for this to be a bit more legible.
In service of this, `Login` is no longer extractable. You have to get an identity.
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Canonicalization does two things:
* It prevents duplicate names that differ only by case or only by normalization/encoding sequence; and
* It makes certain name-based comparisons "case-insensitive" (generalizing via Unicode's case-folding rules).
This change is complicated, as it means that every name now needs to be stored in two forms. Unfortunately, this is _very likely_ a breaking schema change. The migrations in this commit perform a best-effort attempt to canonicalize existing channel or login names, but it's likely any existing channels or logins with non-ASCII characters will not be canonicalize correctly. Since clients look at all channel names and all login names on boot, and since the code in this commit verifies canonicalization when reading from the database, this will effectively make the server un-usuable until any incorrectly-canonicalized values are either manually canonicalized, or removed
It might be possible to do better with [the `icu` sqlite3 extension][icu], but (a) I'm not convinced of that and (b) this commit is already huge; adding database extension support would make it far larger.
[icu]: https://sqlite.org/src/dir/ext/icu
For some references on why it's worth storing usernames this way, see <https://www.b-list.org/weblog/2018/nov/26/case/> and the refernced talk, as well as <https://www.b-list.org/weblog/2018/feb/11/usernames/>. Bennett's treatment of this issue is, to my eye, much more readable than the referenced Unicode technical reports, and I'm inclined to trust his opinion given that he maintains a widely-used, internet-facing user registration library for Django.
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This normalizes the following values:
* login names
* passwords
* channel names
* message bodies, because why not
The goal here is to have a canonical representation of these values, so that, for example, the service does not inadvertently host two channels whose names are semantically identical but differ in the specifics of how diacritics are encoded, or two users whose names are identical.
Normalization is done on input from the wire, using Serde hooks, and when reading from the database. The `crate::nfc::String` type implements these normalizations (as well as normalizing whenever converted from a `std::string::String` generally).
This change does not cover:
* Trying to cope with passwords that were created as non-normalized strings, which are now non-verifiable as all the paths to verify passwords normalize the input.
* Trying to ensure that non-normalized data in the database compares reasonably to normalized data. Fortunately, we don't _do_ very many string comparisons (I think only login names), so this isn't a huge deal at this stage. Login names will probably have to Get Fixed later on, when we figure out how to handle case folding for login name verification.
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In general:
* If the client can only assume the response is immediately valid (mostly, login creation, where the client cannot monitor the event stream), then 200 Okay, with data describing the server's view of the request.
* If the client can monitor for completion by watching the event stream, then 202 Accepted, with data describing the server's view of the request.
This comes on the heels of a comment I made on Discord:
> hrm
>
> creating a login: 204 No Content, no body
> sending a message: 202 Accepted, no body
> creating a channel: 200 Okay, has a body
>
> past me, what were you on
There wasn't any principled reason for this inconsistency; it happened as the endpoints were written at different times and with different states of mind.
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This is primarily renames and repackagings.
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The following values are considered confidential, and should never be logged, even by accident:
* `Password`, which is a durable bearer token for a specific Login;
* `IdentitySecret`, which is an ephemeral but potentially long-lived bearer token for a specific Login; or
* `IdentityToken`, which may hold cookies containing an `IdentitySecret`.
These values are now wrapped in types whose `Debug` impls output opaque values, so that they can be included in structs that `#[derive(Debug)]` without requiring any additional care. The wrappers also avoid implementing `Display`, to prevent inadvertent `to_string()`s.
We don't bother obfuscating `IdentitySecret`s in memory or in the `.hi` database. There's no point: we'd also need to store the information needed to de-obfuscate them, and they can be freely invalidated and replaced by blanking that table and asking everyone to log in again. Passwords _are_ obfuscated for storage, as they're intended to be durable.
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This'll catch style issues, mostly.
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